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CHINA’S NEW MULTILATERAL 
STATEMENT: THE ASIAN 
INFRASTRUCTURE AND 
INVESTMENT BANK
LA NUEVA DECLARACIÓN MULTILATERAL  
DE CHINA: EL BANCO DE INFRAESTRUCTURA  
E INVERSIÓN DE ASIA1
Resumen 
La creación del Banco de Infraestructura e Inversión de Asia (BIIA) fue 
uno de los últimos movimientos en confirmar el nuevo lugar de la República 
Popular China, no solo como un exportador mayor sino como un  pilar de la 
economía mundial. Esta instalación aparece en un momento cuando Asia y 
otros poderes están llegando a niveles muy altos, no solo con el sinnúmero 
de oportunidades que arriban de unos robustos lazos económicos, sino tam-
bién con ansiedades por parte de los grandes poderes y los países vecinos 
al verse con un rival ante la resurrección de antiguas disputas.
Beijing ha asegurado su primacía en la estructura y  procesos de toma de 
decisiones del banco, ya que se considera necesario que un poder actúe 
como garante de su funcionamiento.  Adicionalmente, instituciones similares 
han sido relativamente exitosas más no inmunes a críticas y riesgos, tales 
como el bloqueo en el proceso de toma decisiones, originado en intereses 
divergentes de miembros. Para prevenir esto, el BIIA debe ser capaz de pro-
ducir resultados tangibles, otorgar una membrecía digna de volverse univer-
sal, desarrollar una serie de políticas núcleo específicas y probar que puede 
adaptarse ante una situación traumática.
A pesar de esto, el banco tiene poco más de un año en existencia, y el cum-
plimiento de los desafíos mencionados aún falta por verse.
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Abstract
The creation of the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB) was 
one of the lasts movements that confirmed the new found place of People’s 
Republic of China not only as major exporter, but as a new pillar of the world 
economy. This instalment comes at a time where Asia and other powers come 
to terms not only of trove of opportunity out of incredibly robust economic ties, 
but the anxiousness from facing a new found rival for other powers, or the 
revival of old disputes in the eyes of neighbours.
Beijing has ensured that its dominance upon the bank’s structure and decisions 
since this bodies often need a major power as guarantor of its functionality. Plus, 
other similar institutions have been relatively successful but no immune to cri-
ticisms and risks like decision-making deadlock out of diverging interests from 
constituents. To prevent this, the AIIB must be able to produce tangible results, 
grant a membership worthy of being universal, develop a set of core specific 
policies and prove to be able to adapt in wake of a traumatic situation.
Despite of this, the bank has been in existence for little over a year and the 
fulfillment of the prior challenges remains to be seen. 
Keywords
AIIB, People’s Republic of China, United States of America, International 
Monetary Fund, World Bank, economic ties.
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Introduction
The AIIB was the most formidable sign in a series of developments that 
heralded a swift in multilateral economic policy. This new participant in the 
cosmos of both international economic organizations was not championed 
by neither western powers nor Japan, but by the People’s Republic of China 
(from now on China). Even if the rise of China is undisputed, the speed and 
direction of it are, at the very least, unexpected. The conclusive evidence that 
proves the importance of this step regarding China’s recovered role as major 
power resides in the membership of this body. 
The name often misleads into thinking that this is a small regional scope bank 
with perhaps less than a dozen members. On the contrary, the memorandum 
of understanding that created the bank signed on June 29th of 2015 in Beijing 
counted the signatures of the representatives of 56 states and pleaded to 
collect a US$100 billion as base capital which included major European eco-
nomies like France, Germany and the United Kingdom, who accepted the do-
minance of China upon the bank’s policy and governance. But what does this 
mean to the perception of China by its neighbours and the world? How does 
this bank intend to operate? How to compare it with other major organisms 
like International Monetary Fund (IMF), and its closest counterpart, the World 
Bank? This article will approach this by first giving a short overview of how the 
perception of China has changed in recent years, in both close neighbours 
and the US. Then it explains in further detail the structure of the bank and then 
it will seek to identify which challenges and features (set by its predecessors) 
the bank must acquire and met once it starts full operations.
China’s economic rise: a short perception overview
Given the millennial history of China, is hard to build a list of places which 
have not dealt with it. However, the scale and intensity of these interrelations 
is unprecedented. For the purpose of picturing this article will remit itself to 
several figures.
According to Trade Map, between 2011 and 2014 chinese exports grew stea-
dily from US$1.8 billion to US$2.3 billion world-wide. In that same period im-
ports went from US$1.7 billion to US$1.9 billion, condensing into a shrinking 
trade surplus which currently stands at little over US$600 million. This stands 
as evidence of major change upon how the world sees China, especially the 
immediate periphery, Japan and Republic of Korea, and the still superpower: 
the United States of America.
In the specific case of the first two a triangle of robust economic interdepen-
dence, described in terms of trade and FDI flow, has formed despite of there 
being difficult political and social hurdles regarding events of World War II and 
the proxy wars that characterized the Cold War.  
Additional to this economic ties robustness, there is a fair degree suspi-
cion, if not animosity, towards China. In the case of the Republic of Korea, 
in a poll which used as time stamp the period between 2002 to 2009, those 
who expressed a somewhat favourable image of China fell from 61% to 
40% and those who held a somewhat unfavourable view stretched to 47% 
(Min, Linan & Jie, 2014).
In historical terms China was not only an active ally of Pyongyang, but once 
it’s forces joined the conflict in 1951 they forced a bloody stalemate with the 
US-led UN forces effectively reaffirming the separation of both Koreas at the 
Panmunjom talks, forcing whatever links that existed to remain strained until 
the 80´s. Even today communications remain spotty between leaders since 
animosity still exists over both the perception of historical events or territorial 
disputes that remain unresolved.
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This perception swift also hit the United States. Such relationship is worthy of 
being noted since China was the first major communist state approached by 
the US government. The interdependent nature of the US and Chinese eco-
nomy moved from market supply to a far more equitable mechanic in whom 
the US remains as the main destination of Chinese exports, and China is the 
main holder of US debt. For Glasser (2014), in her paper “US-China Relations 
Managing Differences Remains an Urgent Challenge”, identified three new 
aspects in which both countries might swing into conflict: increased tensions 
over political and economic issues; military conflict as result of an inadvertent 
or deliberate action; and Cold War- like strategic competition out of increasing 
mistrust or diverging interests.
The creation of the AIIB can be found falling in the first and last potential sou-
rce of conflict, since the US has officially declined to join the Bank and critici-
zed the accession of longstanding allies like the United Kingdom and France. 
Besides, there is the fact that the establishment of this new financial institution 
has been considered tantamount to the one of the Bretton-Woods system, as 
it competes in focus to that of the World Bank. On the other hand, this arises 
the question: are these claims properly substantiated? To answer it, careful 
thought must be given to the actual structure of the bank and how it intends to 
operate compared to that of its main rival, the World Bank.
AIIB’s structure 
The AIIB describes itself as a Multilateral Development Bank (MDB) focu-
sed in the development of infrastructure in Asia and insists on complementing 
and cooperating with other MDB’s. Up to this point is very similar to institu-
tions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank itself. Chin 
(2016) notes a fundamental difference which is related to the way the bank has 
setup its governance as a three levelled governance structure composed by: 
a board of governors and directors; a president; a vice-president and staff; as 
opposed to the World Bank where’s there’s a sole governor’s board.
More differences are noted after this point which reflects the commanding 
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position of China in this institution. At the beginning being China, the main 
contributor of capital (US$29.71 billion of the US$100 billion of base capital), 
would hold veto powers at the level of the director’s board. Such veto powers 
were upheld once Japan and the United States rejected joining; even if China 
manifested that upon their accession it would curb its attributions for vetoing 
decisions and share of voting rights. The formula subscribed in article 28 of 
the “Agreement articles” of the AIIB can be summarized as follows: 
In multilateral banks the way members vote (number of voting rights) is deter-
mined by a default formula which differentiates three types of votes: Founder 
votes (votes exercised by founding members only), share votes (which repre-
sent a capital contribution) and basic votes (a pre-determined amount) so 
decision-making not only has to consider how many members vote for and 
against but also how much of the bank’s capital is represented during the vote 
itself. In this case, member receives the 12% out of the aggregate sum of all 
the votes previously mentioned
Within the bank, itself China has built in a “de facto” veto power in the main 
governing corps: The board of governors. Normally, a proposition only needs 
a majority to pass through this body. Despite of this, when the bill concerns 
membership, structure of the bank and capital increases not two thirds of the 
governors must concur but their voting rights must represent three quarters of 
the total, as well. A condition virtually impossible to fulfill with out convincing 
the Chinese governors.
Whereas the board of directors, who are elected by the governors, only requi-
re a majority but are entitled to cast the votes of several members separately 
(Articles of agreement, 2015). It must be noted that non-regional members 
only hold less of a third of the share of voting rights; but Beijing insists, for 
the sake of perceptions, that it will not dominate nor politicize bank decisions, 
which is one of the main criticism against this type of specific international 
organizations (Chin, 2016).
Other MDB’s: The standards they’ve set to the AIIB 
The most representative MDB’s are the IMF and the World Bank. The two 
exist since the moment the Bretton-Wood system was established; the ad-
mittance to the World Bank is conditioned by the membership to the IMF. 
Thus, the cases in which a state is not a member are in essence rare.
The most representative cases are Cuba and North Korea; under the argu-
ment of the dominance of selected powers. On the other hand, Kahler (2016) 
describes the features of the first two in particular. First, they are “effective”, 
their actions have practical effects and their institutional framework has evol-
ved to maintain a functional collaboration/regulation framework. Second, their 
membership is almost “universal”. Third, their norms and procedures are “ex-
clusive”, once they endorse a practice or policy, it is considered a part of their 
organizational identity and modus operandi. This often gives rise to controver-
sies regarding their effects and intended goals. Fourth, they’re “adaptable”, 
these bodies have proven to be capable to cope with new actors and environ-
mental shifts allowing them to potentially expand their lifespan.
Despite of this, life for these is not without obstacles. For starters, reform is 
often undertaken under severe pressure since the main threat for any interna-
tional organization is irrelevant. When the economic environment is relatively 
calm, the demand for the action of this kind of bodies decreases. Plus, the 
structural and diplomatic constraints of these bodies might make them unsui-
table for certain situations. Nonetheless, when crises arise they often provide 
effective policy guidance with both much needed anchorage for developed 
economies and incentives to join and engage for emerging economies. 
Another delicate area for their bodies is their relationship with their constituents 
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since this has to balance both efficacy and legitimacy. Such balance becomes 
harder to achieve, since crises often force these organizations to be far more in-
clusive. Achieving the necessary consensus to act becomes a difficult task sin-
ce the agendas of members might conflict with each other. In the specific case 
of this kind of institutions it can be said, that it has been the conditional support 
of emerging economies; that often use their accession to this platforms to voice 
discontent with economic system and push for reforms. As Khaler (2016) expla-
ins “Their discontent with the global economic order has centered on two linked 
issues: asymmetries that are embedded in global institutions and the degree of 
policy autonomy permitted by the existing global governance rules”.
By asymmetries, this refers to the fact that these bodies, contrary to those 
with general competence or other technical scopes, allow that some mem-
bers have a more meaningful representation according to the size of their 
contribution to the basic capital, and often offer perks exclusive for founders. 
By policy autonomy, it refers to the feature of “exclusivity of practices”: parti-
cular bodies champion specific policies and often condition membership or 
support to the domestic enforcement of such policies regardless of current 
capacities or circumstances.
In the case AIIB the four features mentioned before (effectiveness, universa-
lity of membership, exclusivity of practices and adaptability) are not easy to 
analyse since the bank itself has little over a year of existence. Despite of 
this, it is showing a potential for universality, even if it failed to woo the United 
States and Japan into joining.  It managed to have Asian tigers like the ROK, 
major European parties like France, Germany and the United Kingdom, and 
Oceanic partners like Australia.
Conclusion
The AIIB’s instalment comes at time when the world’s economic ties with 
China have reached an unprecedented level; in both value and volume, pro-
ducing never seen opportunities in the country. On the other hand, this has 
also caused anxieties related with old conflicts and the Cold War, giving rise to 
the questions: Is China expanding to create a safe influence perimeter? Or is 
it expanding to reclaim the status it enjoyed several centuries ago as the only 
real superpower on earth?
The only thing that so far seems evident is that its influence has grown 
in such a way that it looks as an attractive alternative to other powers. In the 
case of AIIB it has ditched the sole instance decision-making body of other 
organisms and transformed it into a dual chamber organism in which regional 
economies hold a major participatory stake under Chinese lead. Nonetheless, 
the experience of the IMF and the World Bank show that its feasibility and 
effectiveness will be measured in how it copes with crises and the demands 
of change that emerge from its constituents although it is still too early to tell.
Even so the features of these changes could be the suggested by this 
years’ events with being the first one the overall de-acceleration of China’s 
economy could be a challenge to the efficacy of the Bank’s of the decisions. 
This includes the possibility of the bank extending membership to other Ame-
rican and African states, fostering policies which might be based on coveted 
Asian economic measures to fulfill the criteria of exclusivity of practices and 
how it will cope with traumas like Brexit and the uncertainty of a roll-back of 
US commitments in the international arena. These changes are happening 
at an unprecedented speed and are born out of a general protest against 
the current economic consensus making the context in which the bank was 
conceived far more defiant for multilateral organizations.
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